OWASP Security Best Practices Skill
Apply these security standards when writing or reviewing code.
Quick Reference: OWASP Top 10:2025
| # | Vulnerability | Key Prevention |
|---|
| A01 | Broken Access Control | Deny by default, enforce server-side, verify ownership |
| A02 | Security Misconfiguration | Harden configs, disable defaults, minimize features |
| A03 | Supply Chain Failures | Lock versions, verify integrity, audit dependencies |
| A04 | Cryptographic Failures | TLS 1.2+, AES-256-GCM, Argon2/bcrypt for passwords |
| A05 | Injection | Parameterized queries, input validation, safe APIs |
| A06 | Insecure Design | Threat model, rate limit, design security controls |
| A07 | Auth Failures | MFA, check breached passwords, secure sessions |
| A08 | Integrity Failures | Sign packages, SRI for CDN, safe serialization |
| A09 | Logging Failures | Log security events, structured format, alerting |
| A10 | Exception Handling | Fail-closed, hide internals, log with context |
Security Code Review Checklist
When reviewing code, check for these issues:
Authentication & Sessions
Access Control
Data Protection
Error Handling
Secure Code Patterns
SQL Injection Prevention
python
1# UNSAFE
2cursor.execute(f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = {user_id}")
3
4# SAFE
5cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = %s", (user_id,))
Command Injection Prevention
python
1# UNSAFE
2os.system(f"convert {filename} output.png")
3
4# SAFE
5subprocess.run(["convert", filename, "output.png"], shell=False)
Password Storage
python
1# UNSAFE
2hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest()
3
4# SAFE
5from argon2 import PasswordHasher
6PasswordHasher().hash(password)
Access Control
python
1# UNSAFE - No authorization check
2@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
3def get_user(user_id):
4 return db.get_user(user_id)
5
6# SAFE - Authorization enforced
7@app.route('/api/user/<user_id>')
8@login_required
9def get_user(user_id):
10 if current_user.id != user_id and not current_user.is_admin:
11 abort(403)
12 return db.get_user(user_id)
Error Handling
python
1# UNSAFE - Exposes internals
2@app.errorhandler(Exception)
3def handle_error(e):
4 return str(e), 500
5
6# SAFE - Fail-closed, log context
7@app.errorhandler(Exception)
8def handle_error(e):
9 error_id = uuid.uuid4()
10 logger.exception(f"Error {error_id}: {e}")
11 return {"error": "An error occurred", "id": str(error_id)}, 500
Fail-Closed Pattern
python
1# UNSAFE - Fail-open
2def check_permission(user, resource):
3 try:
4 return auth_service.check(user, resource)
5 except Exception:
6 return True # DANGEROUS!
7
8# SAFE - Fail-closed
9def check_permission(user, resource):
10 try:
11 return auth_service.check(user, resource)
12 except Exception as e:
13 logger.error(f"Auth check failed: {e}")
14 return False # Deny on error
Agentic AI Security (OWASP 2026)
When building or reviewing AI agent systems, check for:
| Risk | Description | Mitigation |
|---|
| ASI01: Goal Hijack | Prompt injection alters agent objectives | Input sanitization, goal boundaries, behavioral monitoring |
| ASI02: Tool Misuse | Tools used in unintended ways | Least privilege, fine-grained permissions, validate I/O |
| ASI03: Privilege Abuse | Credential escalation across agents | Short-lived scoped tokens, identity verification |
| ASI04: Supply Chain | Compromised plugins/MCP servers | Verify signatures, sandbox, allowlist plugins |
| ASI05: Code Execution | Unsafe code generation/execution | Sandbox execution, static analysis, human approval |
| ASI06: Memory Poisoning | Corrupted RAG/context data | Validate stored content, segment by trust level |
| ASI07: Agent Comms | Spoofing between agents | Authenticate, encrypt, verify message integrity |
| ASI08: Cascading Failures | Errors propagate across systems | Circuit breakers, graceful degradation, isolation |
| ASI09: Trust Exploitation | Social engineering via AI | Label AI content, user education, verification steps |
| ASI10: Rogue Agents | Compromised agents acting maliciously | Behavior monitoring, kill switches, anomaly detection |
Agent Security Checklist
ASVS 5.0 Key Requirements
Level 1 (All Applications)
- Passwords minimum 12 characters
- Check against breached password lists
- Rate limiting on authentication
- Session tokens 128+ bits entropy
- HTTPS everywhere
Level 2 (Sensitive Data)
- All L1 requirements plus:
- MFA for sensitive operations
- Cryptographic key management
- Comprehensive security logging
- Input validation on all parameters
Level 3 (Critical Systems)
- All L1/L2 requirements plus:
- Hardware security modules for keys
- Threat modeling documentation
- Advanced monitoring and alerting
- Penetration testing validation
Language-Specific Security Quirks
Important: The examples below are illustrative starting points, not exhaustive. When reviewing code, think like a senior security researcher: consider the language's memory model, type system, standard library pitfalls, ecosystem-specific attack vectors, and historical CVE patterns. Each language has deeper quirks beyond what's listed here.
Different languages have unique security pitfalls. Here are the top 20 languages with key security considerations. Go deeper for the specific language you're working in:
JavaScript / TypeScript
Main Risks: Prototype pollution, XSS, eval injection
javascript
1// UNSAFE: Prototype pollution
2Object.assign(target, userInput)
3// SAFE: Use null prototype or validate keys
4Object.assign(Object.create(null), validated)
5
6// UNSAFE: eval injection
7eval(userCode)
8// SAFE: Never use eval with user input
Watch for: eval(), innerHTML, document.write(), prototype chain manipulation, __proto__
Python
Main Risks: Pickle deserialization, format string injection, shell injection
python
1# UNSAFE: Pickle RCE
2pickle.loads(user_data)
3# SAFE: Use JSON or validate source
4json.loads(user_data)
5
6# UNSAFE: Format string injection
7query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = '%s'" % user_input
8# SAFE: Parameterized
9cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM users WHERE name = %s", (user_input,))
Watch for: pickle, eval(), exec(), os.system(), subprocess with shell=True
Java
Main Risks: Deserialization RCE, XXE, JNDI injection
java
1// UNSAFE: Arbitrary deserialization
2ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(userStream);
3Object obj = ois.readObject();
4
5// SAFE: Use allowlist or JSON
6ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
7mapper.readValue(json, SafeClass.class);
Watch for: ObjectInputStream, Runtime.exec(), XML parsers without XXE protection, JNDI lookups
C#
Main Risks: Deserialization, SQL injection, path traversal
csharp
1// UNSAFE: BinaryFormatter RCE
2BinaryFormatter bf = new BinaryFormatter();
3object obj = bf.Deserialize(stream);
4
5// SAFE: Use System.Text.Json
6var obj = JsonSerializer.Deserialize<SafeType>(json);
Watch for: BinaryFormatter, JavaScriptSerializer, TypeNameHandling.All, raw SQL strings
PHP
Main Risks: Type juggling, file inclusion, object injection
php
1// UNSAFE: Type juggling in auth
2if ($password == $stored_hash) { ... }
3// SAFE: Use strict comparison
4if (hash_equals($stored_hash, $password)) { ... }
5
6// UNSAFE: File inclusion
7include($_GET['page'] . '.php');
8// SAFE: Allowlist pages
9$allowed = ['home', 'about']; include(in_array($page, $allowed) ? "$page.php" : 'home.php');
Watch for: == vs ===, include/require, unserialize(), preg_replace with /e, extract()
Go
Main Risks: Race conditions, template injection, slice bounds
go
1// UNSAFE: Race condition
2go func() { counter++ }()
3// SAFE: Use sync primitives
4atomic.AddInt64(&counter, 1)
5
6// UNSAFE: Template injection
7template.HTML(userInput)
8// SAFE: Let template escape
9{{.UserInput}}
Watch for: Goroutine data races, template.HTML(), unsafe package, unchecked slice access
Ruby
Main Risks: Mass assignment, YAML deserialization, regex DoS
ruby
1# UNSAFE: Mass assignment
2User.new(params[:user])
3# SAFE: Strong parameters
4User.new(params.require(:user).permit(:name, :email))
5
6# UNSAFE: YAML RCE
7YAML.load(user_input)
8# SAFE: Use safe_load
9YAML.safe_load(user_input)
Watch for: YAML.load, Marshal.load, eval, send with user input, .permit!
Rust
Main Risks: Unsafe blocks, FFI boundary issues, integer overflow in release
rust
1// CAUTION: Unsafe bypasses safety
2unsafe { ptr::read(user_ptr) }
3
4// CAUTION: Release integer overflow
5let x: u8 = 255;
6let y = x + 1; // Wraps to 0 in release!
7// SAFE: Use checked arithmetic
8let y = x.checked_add(1).unwrap_or(255);
Watch for: unsafe blocks, FFI calls, integer overflow in release builds, .unwrap() on untrusted input
Swift
Main Risks: Force unwrapping crashes, Objective-C interop
swift
1// UNSAFE: Force unwrap on untrusted data
2let value = jsonDict["key"]!
3// SAFE: Safe unwrapping
4guard let value = jsonDict["key"] else { return }
5
6// UNSAFE: Format string
7String(format: userInput, args)
8// SAFE: Don't use user input as format
Watch for: force unwrap (!), try!, ObjC bridging, NSSecureCoding misuse
Kotlin
Main Risks: Null safety bypass, Java interop, serialization
kotlin
1// UNSAFE: Platform type from Java
2val len = javaString.length // NPE if null
3// SAFE: Explicit null check
4val len = javaString?.length ?: 0
5
6// UNSAFE: Reflection
7clazz.getDeclaredMethod(userInput)
8// SAFE: Allowlist methods
Watch for: Java interop nulls (! operator), reflection, serialization, platform types
C / C++
Main Risks: Buffer overflow, use-after-free, format string
c
1// UNSAFE: Buffer overflow
2char buf[10]; strcpy(buf, userInput);
3// SAFE: Bounds checking
4strncpy(buf, userInput, sizeof(buf) - 1);
5
6// UNSAFE: Format string
7printf(userInput);
8// SAFE: Always use format specifier
9printf("%s", userInput);
Watch for: strcpy, sprintf, gets, pointer arithmetic, manual memory management, integer overflow
Scala
Main Risks: XML external entities, serialization, pattern matching exhaustiveness
scala
1// UNSAFE: XXE
2val xml = XML.loadString(userInput)
3// SAFE: Disable external entities
4val factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance()
5factory.setFeature("http://xml.org/sax/features/external-general-entities", false)
Watch for: Java interop issues, XML parsing, Serializable, exhaustive pattern matching
R
Main Risks: Code injection, file path manipulation
r
1# UNSAFE: eval injection
2eval(parse(text = user_input))
3# SAFE: Never parse user input as code
4
5# UNSAFE: Path traversal
6read.csv(paste0("data/", user_file))
7# SAFE: Validate filename
8if (grepl("^[a-zA-Z0-9]+\\.csv$", user_file)) read.csv(...)
Watch for: eval(), parse(), source(), system(), file path manipulation
Perl
Main Risks: Regex injection, open() injection, taint mode bypass
perl
1# UNSAFE: Regex DoS
2$input =~ /$user_pattern/;
3# SAFE: Use quotemeta
4$input =~ /\Q$user_pattern\E/;
5
6# UNSAFE: open() command injection
7open(FILE, $user_file);
8# SAFE: Three-argument open
9open(my $fh, '<', $user_file);
Watch for: Two-arg open(), regex from user input, backticks, eval, disabled taint mode
Shell (Bash)
Main Risks: Command injection, word splitting, globbing
bash
1# UNSAFE: Unquoted variables
2rm $user_file
3# SAFE: Always quote
4rm "$user_file"
5
6# UNSAFE: eval
7eval "$user_command"
8# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: Unquoted variables, eval, backticks, $(...) with user input, missing set -euo pipefail
Lua
Main Risks: Sandbox escape, loadstring injection
lua
1-- UNSAFE: Code injection
2loadstring(user_code)()
3-- SAFE: Use sandboxed environment with restricted functions
Watch for: loadstring, loadfile, dofile, os.execute, io library, debug library
Elixir
Main Risks: Atom exhaustion, code injection, ETS access
elixir
1# UNSAFE: Atom exhaustion DoS
2String.to_atom(user_input)
3# SAFE: Use existing atoms only
4String.to_existing_atom(user_input)
5
6# UNSAFE: Code injection
7Code.eval_string(user_input)
8# SAFE: Never eval user input
Watch for: String.to_atom, Code.eval_string, :erlang.binary_to_term, ETS public tables
Dart / Flutter
Main Risks: Platform channel injection, insecure storage
dart
1// UNSAFE: Storing secrets in SharedPreferences
2prefs.setString('auth_token', token);
3// SAFE: Use flutter_secure_storage
4secureStorage.write(key: 'auth_token', value: token);
Watch for: Platform channel data, dart:mirrors, Function.apply, insecure local storage
PowerShell
Main Risks: Command injection, execution policy bypass
powershell
1# UNSAFE: Injection
2Invoke-Expression $userInput
3# SAFE: Avoid Invoke-Expression with user data
4
5# UNSAFE: Unvalidated path
6Get-Content $userPath
7# SAFE: Validate path is within allowed directory
Watch for: Invoke-Expression, & $userVar, Start-Process with user args, -ExecutionPolicy Bypass
SQL (All Dialects)
Main Risks: Injection, privilege escalation, data exfiltration
sql
1-- UNSAFE: String concatenation
2"SELECT * FROM users WHERE id = " + userId
3
4-- SAFE: Parameterized query (language-specific)
5-- Use prepared statements in ALL cases
Watch for: Dynamic SQL, EXECUTE IMMEDIATE, stored procedures with dynamic queries, privilege grants
Deep Security Analysis Mindset
When reviewing any language, think like a senior security researcher:
- Memory Model: How does the language handle memory? Managed vs manual? GC pauses exploitable?
- Type System: Weak typing = type confusion attacks. Look for coercion exploits.
- Serialization: Every language has its pickle/Marshal equivalent. All are dangerous.
- Concurrency: Race conditions, TOCTOU, atomicity failures specific to the threading model.
- FFI Boundaries: Native interop is where type safety breaks down.
- Standard Library: Historic CVEs in std libs (Python urllib, Java XML, Ruby OpenSSL).
- Package Ecosystem: Typosquatting, dependency confusion, malicious packages.
- Build System: Makefile/gradle/npm script injection during builds.
- Runtime Behavior: Debug vs release differences (Rust overflow, C++ assertions).
- Error Handling: How does the language fail? Silently? With stack traces? Fail-open?
For any language not listed: Research its specific CWE patterns, CVE history, and known footguns. The examples above are entry points, not complete coverage.
When to Apply This Skill
Use this skill when:
- Writing authentication or authorization code
- Handling user input or external data
- Implementing cryptography or password storage
- Reviewing code for security vulnerabilities
- Designing API endpoints
- Building AI agent systems
- Configuring application security settings
- Handling errors and exceptions
- Working with third-party dependencies
- Working in any language - apply the deep analysis mindset above